



Economic Development of Bhutan: An Untold Story







	Bhutan is a small landlocked country at the foothills of the Himalayas. An especially rigorous mountainous terrain, lack of easy access to seaports, and a small population living in scattered low-density settlements all conspire to make life difficult in Bhutan. Yet, unnoticed by most of the outside world, the country has quietly made significant strides in both economic and social spheres. The economy has grown at an average rate of close to 7 per cent per annum for more than two decades, lifting the material standard of living more than two-and-a-half fold within a single generation. At the same time, a benevolent welfare-oriented state has tried to ensure that every one of its citizens is assured of minimum basic needs such as access to land, housing, health and education. As a result of these efforts, mortality has gone down sharply, life expectancy has soared and the goal of universal access to basic education is well within sight, even though it still remains poor enough to be designated as a Least Developed Country by UN definition. Significantly, Bhutan has achieved all this without the kind of environmental degradation and cultural atrophy that has bedevilled the development efforts of many other countries in the world.
	The nation of Bhutan was born in the early seventeenth century, when a number of small but independent principalities were brought together under a unified administration by a charismatic leader called Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal. He established a theocracy and gave Bhutan an administrative system and a code of law, which worked reasonably well for over two centuries. However, by the second half of the 19th century, frequent disputes over the issue of succession to the office of the Shabdrung brought internal strife and instability in the country. In a bid to restore stability, the clergy, the ruling elite, and representatives of the people unanimously decided in 1907 to establish a monarchy, marking the beginning of a new era in the history of Bhutan. Ugyen Wangchuck was chosen as the first hereditary King of Bhutan. By uniting the country and establishing a central authority, he brought peace and stability to the country and laid the foundation for the emergence of modern Bhutan.
	Throughout its history, Bhutan has remained independent, being one of the few countries in Asia never to become a colony. Bhutan was fairly isolated from the outside world until the 1960s when the third King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck (1928-1972) opened links with other countries and initiated the development of a modern economy. He also introduced many social, legal and constitutional reforms, which had far reaching effects.
	There has been until now no room for formal democracy in the polity of Bhutan. However, the present King Jigme Singye Wangchuck, who acceded the throne in 1972, has tried to open the way for increasing people’s participation in decision-making processes in a gradual step-by-step manner. The majority members of the National Assembly, the supreme legislative body of the country, consist of popularly elected representatives, albeit on non-party basis. The scope for people’s participation was expanded further when decentralization of administration was implemented in 1981 through the establishment of Development Committees at the Dzongkhag (district) level followed by further decentralization to the Gewog (block) level in 1991. In 1998, the King gave up the position of the head of the government, retaining only the position of the head of the State. Most significantly, he has inspired and personally guided the drafting of a new constitution, which will transform Bhutan into a constitutional monarchy in 2007, ushering in for the first time the era of multi-party democracy.
	Apart from guiding the process of political transition towards democracy, the present King has also shaped the broad strategy of economic and social development of Bhutan through a series of personal initiatives. Indeed, much of what is good about Bhutan today is generally attributed to the wisdom and benevolence of the present King. His most important contribution in this regard has been the enunciation of a new paradigm of development, christened as the Gross National Happiness (GNH) approach to development. Fusing the traditional values of Buddhism with modern concerns with environment and equity, the GNH approach explicitly shuns the purely materialistic approach to development. It calls for a holistic approach to development embracing material, environmental, cultural and spiritual goals. Although there remains some ambiguity in the interpretation and implementation of the GNH approach, its underlying philosophy has guided policymaking at all levels over the last two and a half decades.
	The other factor that has shaped the destiny of Bhutan is its close relationship with India. Until about 1960, Bhutan’s main external links were with Tibet in the north. But in the early 1960s, the links with Tibet were closed and economic transactions with India in the south gained prominence, mainly as a consequence of geo-political rivalries between India and China. Since then, the Bhutanese economy has become inextricably linked with that of India. Before Bhutan introduced its own currency Ngultrum in 1974, Indian rupee circulated freely as the medium if exchange. Even after Ngultrum was introduced, Indian rupee continued to remain side by side, exchanged with Ngultrum on a one-to-one basis, leading to a virtual dual currency system. A Free Trade agreement with India ensures free exchange of goods and services between the two countries, with payments being made in Indian rupee, which spares Bhutan the onerous task of earning hard currency for most of its imports. India remains by far the largest trading partner of Bhutan, accounting for over 90 per cent of its exports and over 80 per cent of imports. India provides generous budgetary support in the form of grants; during the 1990s, these grants financed almost 45 per cent of total budgetary expenditure. Since the internal revenue earned by the government of Bhutan is spent almost entirely on current expenditure, its is the Indian grants, supplemented by funds from other donors, that has been the main resource with which Bhutan has built up its physical infrastructure over the years. India also provides substantial extra-budgetary support, especially in the form of investment funds for the massive hydropower projects that have been the main driving force of the economy over the last two decades. India also supplies the workers, machinery and technical expertise for building the hydropower projects, and eventually purchases most of the electricity at a negotiated price. Because of these multi-faceted relationships, both the economy and politics of India have a profound impact on the opportunities and constraints faced by Bhutan.


II. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE MACROECONOMIC SCENARIO

II.1 Growth and Structural Change

	The economy of Bhutan has grown strongly in recent decades. Going back to 1980, the year from which systematic and consistent national accounts data are available, GDP has grown at an average rate of 7.0 per cent per annum in the quarter century to 2004. No other country in the South Asia region, and not many in the developing world, has achieved such a high rate of growth over such an extended period of time. Indeed, in terms of at least the rate of growth, Bhutan would appear to belong to almost the same league as the high performing Southeast Asian economies. A more detailed analysis shows, however, that unlike the Southeast Asian countries Bhutan has not been able to translate its high rate of growth into fundamental structural change of the economy, in particular to usher in an era of modern industrialization. Its growth has been underpinned mainly by export of hydropower to India and activities related to hydropower, but the resulting growth has yet to lay the foundations of a modern industrial economy.
	Nonetheless, sustained high growth has led to substantial improvement in the living standards of the Bhutanese people. In the absence of reliable data on population growth​[1]​, it is hard to be sure about the magnitude of improvement in terms of per capita income. However, using a rough estimate of population growth of around 3 per cent based on fragmentary evidence, per capita income would have increased at the highly respectable rate of around 4 per cent per annum for the past quarter century. This implies that the current generation of the Bhutanese people is on the average more than two-and-a-half times richer than the immediately preceding generation. To achieve so much in just one generation is highly commendable by any standards.
	Sectoral breakdown of growth rates and sources of growth clearly demonstrate that the driving force of the Bhutanese economy has been industry, broadly defined to include both energy and construction sectors in addition to manufacturing. In the quarter century to 2004, industry was the fastest growing sector with an annual average growth rate of over 12 per cent. Services came a distant second, with a growth rate of about 6 per cent – half of that of industry, while agriculture was a long way behind with a growth rate of just 3.6 per cent (Table 1). Agriculture did particularly poorly in the early 1990s, and while it has since recovered somewhat, it still remains the weakest sector of the Bhutanese economy.
	The economy has undergone significant structural shifts as a result of these trends. In 1980, agriculture accounted for over half of total GDP, but by 2004 its share came down to barely a quarter, while the share of industry went up from just 14 per cent in 1980 to as high as 45 per cent in 2004. In the mean time, the service sector held its own with a share of about 30 per cent (Table 2).







                            Table 1: Average Annual Growth Rates: 1980-2004















                  Table 2: Sectoral Share of Output















Table 3: Growth Rates of Major Sub-Sectors














	In fact, over the last decade, construction has been the most dynamic sector of the Bhutanese economy growing at nearly 20 per cent per annum, compared to just 5 per cent for manufacturing. During this decade, as much as a quarter of GDP growth has come from the construction sector, much of it being energy-related. Another 16 per cent has come directly from the energy sector, while only 10 per cent of GDP growth has come from manufacturing.
	During the last decade, the direct output of the energy sector has also grown relatively slowly (at less than 4 per cent per annum), but it should be noted that a large part of the construction activity that has occurred in the recent years is related to the upcoming Tala hydropower project, another part being accounted for by an unprecedented housing boom. Moreover, a large part of the manufacturing activities is also dependent on hydropower as they specialise in power-intensive products such as cement, calcium carbide and ferro alloys. Thus one way or the other it is the energy sector that has provided the major stimulus to growth in the Bhutanese economy.
	But this stimulus has largely bypassed the agricultural sector and only marginally benefited manufacturing. The situation with agriculture is particularly precarious as it currently contributes only one-fourth of the GDP while absorbing as much as 63 per cent of the labour force. At the same time, the rural people are stuck in agriculture despite its lack of dynamism because manufacturing does not provide an alternative source of employment for most of them. The classical pattern of development whereby productivity growth in agriculture allows labour to be released from land so that they can be absorbed into an expanding manufacturing sector has so far eluded Bhutan. Infusing dynamism into agriculture and manufacturing remains a major challenge for Bhutan in the years ahead.


II.2 Savings and Investment

	Rapid growth of the Bhutanese economy has been underpinned by exceptionally high rates of savings and investment. Over a period of nearly two decades and a half (1981-2003), gross investment (gross domestic capital formation) has grown at the average rate of 10 per cent per annum while GDP has grown at an average rate of about 7 per cent. Moreover, the gap between capital growth and output growth has widened over time, indicating that the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) is rising fast in Bhutan. Normally, rising ICOR would be a matter of concern, as it would indicate falling productivity of capital. In the case of Bhutan, however, changes in ICOR as normally measured should be interpreted with caution. Much of the recent rise in ICOR is explained by the fact that a great deal of physical infrastructure is being created in connection with the massive Tala hydropower project, while the output of the project has yet to arrive. 




  Table 4: Rates of Savings and Investment: 1981-2003
                                                                                               (Periodic annual average; as % of GDP)
	1981-85	1986-90	1991-95	1996-00	2001-03
					
Gross domestic investment	 41.7	33.3	44.8	43.7	63.7
Net capital inflow	 46.8	18.8	17.1	23.3	24.9
Gross domestic saving	 -5.2	14.5	29.0	22.2	40.8
					
        Public saving	-12.6	 2.3	 5.5	 2.5	 3.6
        Private saving	   7.4	12.3	23.5	19.7	37.2
Source: Estimated from NSB (2000) and NSB (2004a).




	So far, a combination of high domestic savings rate and generous inflow of foreign assistance, mostly from India, has sustained the high rate of capital formation, although the relative contributions of these two sources have changed dramatically over the last two and a half decades. In the early 1980s, gross domestic saving was actually negative, to the tune of nearly 5 per cent of GDP (Table 4). However as the Chhukha hydropower project brought in unprecedented revenue for the government after 1986, domestic savings gradually became large enough to eclipse foreign capital as the major source of investment finance. After 2000, domestic savings have become exceptionally high at 41 per cent of GDP.


II.3 The Fiscal Regime

	 Given the low level of development of the private sector, the government has traditionally played an important role in the Bhutanese economy – not only in providing infrastructure and social services but also in producing economic goods and services. As a result, the size of fiscal operations is exceptionally large in Bhutan by South Asian standards. Of the various production activities undertaken by the government, the expenditure on large hydropower projects is kept outside the budget (although the dividends and taxes earned from the projects are included in the revenue side of the budget). In spite of this exclusion, government expenditure has accounted for over 40 per cent of GDP in recent years (Table 5), making the relative size of the government in Bhutan by far the largest in South Asia.
	The large size of government budget is sustained to a considerable degree by foreign assistance, of which the lion’s share comes from India. During the last five years, for example, foreign grants and loans (excluding loans for the major hydropower projects) contributed nearly 45 per cent of total budgetary expenditure. Of the remaining 55 per cent that was contributed by domestic revenue the major part was also derived indirectly from foreign assistance. This is because the bulk of the revenue came from taxes and dividends of hydropower projects, for which the investment fund came almost entirely from outside (as loans, mostly from India). Thus, directly and indirectly, it is the foreign grants and loans – essentially, Indian grants and loans – that underpins almost the whole of government budget.




     Table 5: Budgetary Trends: 1990/91 – 2003/04
                                                                                       (Periodic average annual figures as % of GDP)
	1990/91 - 1994/95	1995/96 - 1999/00	2000/01 - 2003/04
			
Revenue and Grants	40.04	41.65	35.24
       Revenue	22.24	22.68	20.15
              Tax	6.60	8.78	10.17
              Non-tax	15.64	13.90	9.97
       Grants	17.81	18.96	15.09
Expenditure	40.23	42.69	41.76
       Current	21.03	19.91	18.73
       Capital	19.20	22.79	23.03
Overall deficit	-0.19	-1.05	-6.52
       Foreign loan	0.66	2.02	4.98
       Domestic deficit	-0.47	-0.97	1.53
              Borrowing	-0.07	-0.10	-0.40
              Monetisation	-0.39	-0.87	1.62




	While generous inflow of Indian grants has undoubtedly helped Bhutan to maintain a large budget, domestic resource mobilization has also played a role. The domestic revenue ratio of around 22 per cent of GDP is in fact quite high for a low-income country like Bhutan. This has been made possible by the government’s ability to draw upon an unusually large source of non-tax revenue. In the 1990s, the greater part of domestic revenue came from non-tax sources, in the form of dividends from various corporations in which the government held the majority share. By contrast, the tax effort was very weak. Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP, which averaged about 8 per cent in the 1990s, was actually one of the lowest in South Asia. 
	The overall fiscal position of Bhutan has been remarkably sound. Current expenditure, which was maintained at around 20 per cent of GDP in the 1990s, closely tracked domestic revenue, and generally remained slightly below it yielding a small revenue surplus. In recent years, however, the government has found it increasingly difficult to maintain the overall level of public expenditure. This is mainly because the relative size of foreign grants has fallen sharply – from an average of around 19 per cent of GDP in the second half of the 1990s to only around 15 per cent during FY01-FY04. As a result, the overall budget deficit has increased from just over 1 per cent of GDP in the second half of the 1990s to over 6 per cent of GDP in the next four years.
	The structure of public expenditure in Bhutan exhibits a number of distinctive pro-poor features. First, a serious attempt has been made at fiscal decentralisation. The Ninth Plan made provision for nearly a fourth of total budgetary resources to be spent at the local level – mostly on education and health – in accordance with locally determined priorities. Second, the government has set up separate trust funds dedicated for health, education, and environment in order to protect these sectors from the vagaries of fluctuations in government revenue and foreign grants. Third, a large part of the budget has traditionally been devoted to social sectors, especially health and education. Combining expenditure at central and local levels, it has been estimated that during FY04-FY05, education and health sectors together received 28 per cent of total expenditure. This is not only a very high ratio by South Asian standards, it also represents a big jump from the average of 18 per cent in the 1990s.


II.4 The Monetary Regime

	The government of Bhutan first issued its own paper currency Ngultrum (Nu) in 1974, and pegged it at par with the Indian rupee. Both currencies existed side by side and were used interchangeably for domestic transactions, while only Indian rupee was used for trade with India. This system of dual currency with a one-to-one exchange rate has survived to this day.
	In view of the rather late entry of Bhutan in the world of money, a large part of the economy still works on barter. However, the extent of monetisation is difficult to estimate, especially because an unknown quantity of Indian rupee also circulates within Bhutan as legal tender. Nonetheless, the data on the growth of money supply in relation to GDP does indicate an impressive speed of monetisation, as the supply of broad money increased from 5 per cent of GDP in the early 1980s to over 60 per cent of GDP by the period 2000-2004.




   Table 6: Inflation Trends





Source Estimated from Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators (various years) and Royal Monetary Authority, Annual Report (various years) and GDP figures are from NSB (2004a).and RMA (2005).


	This stability has, however, been achieved not primarily through active monetary or fiscal policy, but through the exchange rate policy of keeping the local currency Ngultrum pegged with Indian rupee. Adoption of a fixed exchange rate with by far the largest trading partner ensures that inflation in Bhutan is essentially one of imported inflation variety, tracking closely the inflation in India. As Indian inflation has remained relatively low by international standards, so has the imported inflation in Bhutan. In particular, the sharp decline in inflation observed in Bhutan after 2000 reflects an equally sharp decline in Indian inflation at the same time rather than any fundamental changes in either the economic structure or policy framework in Bhutan.


II.5 The Trade Regime






             Table 7: Trade Penetration Ratios: 1981-2003
                                                                                                            (Periodic annual averages)




1995 - 1999	32.6	41.0	73.7	 (-)8.4
2000 - 2003	21.9	37.6	59.4	(-)15.7
Source: Estimated from Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators (various years) and Royal Monetary Authority, Annual Report (various years).


	Rising trade ratio has been accompanied by a falling trade deficit. Underlying both the upward trend in the volume of trade and the downward trend in the trade gap relative to GDP is the exceptionally fast increase in the volume of export. Thus, in the period from 1981 to 2003, the dollar value of exports has grown at the compound rate of 8.5 per cent per annum, as against import growth of 5.5 per cent and real GDP growth of 6.5 per cent.
	Although declining, trade deficits have remained large as a result of very high level of imports, which stems from the continued inability of Bhutan’s economy to expand the productive base (outside the power sector). Even after including the earnings from ‘invisibles’, which essentially means earnings from tourism, the current account deficit remains large and growing in absolute terms. These deficits have been sustained by generous grants received from abroad, an increasing proportion of which comes from India. In the mid-1990s, India’s share of grants was already high at around 50 per cent; by 2003/04, it had risen to three-quarters.
	India is also by far the most important trading partner of Bhutan. In the early 1990s, about 88 per cent of all exports were destined for India; a decade later, that proportion has increased to 95 per cent. During the same period, India’s share in imports has increased from 74 per cent to 81 per cent. Bangladesh is the second largest export market for Bhutan, with a share of about 4 per cent, and Japan is the second largest source of imports, also with a share of 4 per cent. 
	A number of factors have contributed to the pre-dominance of India in Bhutan’s external trade. The most important of these are geographical proximity and the support India had provided to Bhutan both for producing exportables (such as electricity) destined for the Indian market and for sustaining imports through generous grants made in non-convertible rupees. All this has been facilitated by an institutional framework that includes a bilateral free trade agreement between the two countries, use of Indian rupee as a medium of exchange both internally in Bhutan and for trade with India, and a fixed exchange rate between rupee and ngultrum.
	The dominance of bilateral trade with India signifies Bhutan’s limited ability to diversify its export markets. This creates a mismatch between the import from and export to third countries as nearly 16 per cent of imports are denominated in convertible currency, while less than 5 per cent of exports earn convertible currency. This mismatch between the earning and spending of hard currency leads to a severe foreign exchange constraint, which continues to plague the Bhutanese economy even as trade with India flourishes.
	It should be pointed out that despite persistent deficit in the hard currency component of the current account, the overall balance has usually been comfortably positive. It means that the availability of hard currency loans has been adequate not only to finance any shortfall in the current account that grants were unable to meet but also to add to the reserves of hard currency. At the same time, the rupee reserve has also increased over the years as a result of a persistently healthy surplus in the rupee component of the current account (with grants), supplemented by the rupee loans received from India. As a result, the reserve position of the Royal Monetary Authority has improved at a great speed over the last decade. Total reserves have shot up more than three-fold increase within a span of just one decade. 


II.6 The Hydropower Economy

	Bhutan can be correctly described as a hydropower economy. Since the commissioning of the Chhukha project, the first major hydropower project in Bhutan, in the mid-1980s, hydropower has emerged as the driving force of the economy. It looms large in almost every aspect of the economy – as a major contributor to GDP, as the single biggest source of government revenue, and as by far the most important item of export. Understanding the Bhutanese economy cannot be complete without a proper appreciation of the role hydropower plays in shaping it.
	Bhutan’s mountainous topography and its fast flowing four major rivers have endowed the country with a great potential to develop hydropower. The first major hydropower project, the 336 MW Chhukha plant, was fully commissioned in 1988 followed by a number of smaller ones. The construction of the largest hydropower project to date, Tala, with an installed capacity of 1,020 MW, was started in 1993 and was scheduled for completion in 2006. Most of the major projects have been developed with Indian assistance based on a 60 per cent grant and 40 per cent loan financing model.
	Ever since the mid-1980s, economic growth of Bhutan has been inextricably linked with the development of hydropower. The share of hydropower output in GDP shot up 0.2 per cent to 11.6 per in 1987, the year Chhukha came on line, and has remained between 8-11 per cent thereafter. The rising contribution has come partly from increased volume of electricity generation and partly from periodic revision of export tariff, which has more than doubled in real terms since 1988.
	Hydropower development has also contributed to GDP growth indirectly by boosting the construction sector through both backward and forward linkages and by facilitating the growth of power-intensive industries. Bhutan’s manufacturing sector is indeed dominated by power- intensive industries such as cement, ferro-alloys and calcium carbide, supported by large subsidy in the form of cheap energy. It is the combined contribution of the energy sector itself, and of energy-related activities such as construction and power-intensive industries that has enabled Bhutan to sustain a remarkably high growth rate of around 7 per cent over a period of two decades, despite slow growth of agriculture.
	Hydropower also makes an overwhelming contribution to the public exchequer, through both tax and non-tax revenue. The average share of hydropower revenues to total domestic revenues for the period 1992/93 to 2001/02 was around 30 percent. It is expected to rise even further to about 50 per cent after the commissioning of the Tala project. Considering the fact that the revenues earned from construction and power-intensive manufacturing industries also owe themselves indirectly to hydropower, it is no exaggeration to say that it is the rents extracted through the exploitation of hydropower that has financed the major chunk of Bhutan’s budget over the years (the other chunk being financed by grants from India).
	Most of the government revenue earned from the sale of hydropower has been used to maintain high levels of social expenditure and for infrastructure. At the same time, most of the earnings from electricity exports have been used to import consumer goods, including essential foodstuff, from India. Without this import, the social expenditure as well as construction and other activities spurred by hydropower development would have faced serious problems due to the wage goods constraint. The softening of the wage goods constraint has been one of the principal pathways through which hydropower contributed to sustaining the growth process in Bhutan. 
	Hydropower also dominates on the export front. Since the commissioning of the Chhukha project in 1986, the share of hydropower in total exports has remained close to 50 per cent. The share is expected to rise substantially after the massive Tala project begins to export electricity to India. Bhutan clearly has a comparative advantage in hydropower, as its costs of production are substantially lower than the current market price in India. Bhutan also has the advantage of possessing an institutional framework that enables export-oriented hydropower projects to be implemented more easily than in India, where hydropower development is hampered by inter-state water disputes and rehabilitation controversies. This is true to a lesser extent for Nepal as well, where NGO opposition to large hydropower projects has been a serious problem.
	For all its potential, though, hydropower has not been able to solve Bhutan’s foreign exchange constraint – in particular the hard currency component of it. For both geographical and political reasons, Bhutan has not so far been able to sell its hydropower to countries other than India – even though potential market exists in Bangladesh, and at a stretch even in China. It has thus made no direct contribution to the earning of hard currency, and it is unlikely to do so in the short-to-medium term. 
	Bhutan’s economy will have to rely on hydropower for the foreseeable future and fortunately for the country a huge potential for expansion still exists. On the supply side, it has been estimated that only 2 percent of the potential has been developed so far. On the demand side, although at present India is the only market for Bhutanese hydropower, the risk of reduced demand from India is very small.  Northern India faces chronic power shortages, which is expected rise even further. At present, Bhutan supplies less than 0.5 percent of India’s demand, which can absorb all the hydropower that Bhutan can develop over the next 20 years.
	There are, however, constraints too, not least of which is the potential environmental hazard of a glacial lake outburst flood, lurking in the Himalayas as a consequence of global warming. The other concerns that have been much discussed of late in Bhutan are possibilities of ‘Dutch disease’ on the one hand and rent-seeking on the other, problems that are often associated with large-scale exploitation of natural resources. Bhutan has largely been able to avoid both these problems so far, but potential dangers remain.


II. Poverty. Human Development and Employment

	Unlike most other countries in the developing world, Bhutan’s economic and social policies have been underpinned by a broad view of poverty that goes beyond the concerns with personal income. Although no systematic attempt was made to measure the prevalence of the multi-dimensional concept of poverty implicitly adopted by Bhutan, casual empiricism suggested to most Bhutanese observers that poverty was not a serious problem in the country. This presumption was based partly on the existence of a kind of welfare state instituted by the King of Bhutan that was unique among the developing countries.
	The evidence to support the benevolent nature of the welfare state in Bhutan is indeed found in the measures of human development recently estimated by RGOB (2005).  From a low value of 0.325 in 1984, HDI has gone up to 0.597 in 2002 i.e., almost doubled within a space of just two decades. The gains appear to be gradually slowing down, however, principally because the earlier gains were made from a smaller base. Nonetheless, Bhutan’s human development index reflects a relatively higher level of human development in comparison with the least developed countries to which it belongs. In South Asia in particular, it has a higher HDI than Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal. Only Maldives, Sri Lanka and India are better placed than Bhutan in terms of HDI.
	The perception of a moderately high level of human development in Bhutan has gone hand in hand with a common perception that that acute and endemic hunger was not as serious a phenomenon here as in most other countries in South Asia. Since the problem was not perceived as serious, there was no felt need to measure it either. A large-scale household income and expenditure survey was conducted for the first time on a pilot basis in the year 2000. Based on the experiences gained from the pilot phase, a more sophisticated household survey, called the Bhutan Living Standard Survey, was conducted in the year 2003. Using the data generated by this survey and by applying the standard procedures for estimating poverty developed by the World Bank and others, the government of Bhutan has for the first time come up with official estimates of poverty. According to these estimates, 32 per cent of the people living in Bhutan were to be counted as poor in the year 2003.
	This estimate has surprised many, including the government itself. For a nation confident in its belief that its welfare state had almost conquered poverty, the message that one in three people lived in poverty was shocking, to say the least. All kinds of questions have been raised about the reliability of data, appropriateness of the methodology of estimation, and so on. A proper scrutiny of the data and the methodology has yet to be undertaken, however. While one must await such a scrutiny before making a final judgement about the quality of the estimate, for the moment one can do no better than going by what estimates are actually available.





     Table 8: Prevalence and Incidence of Poverty: 2003
		Headcount	Share of	Poverty Gap	Poverty Severity
		Ratio (%)	the poor (%)	Index	Index
					
Bhutan		31.7	100	0.085	0.031
      Rural		38.3	97.4	0.105	0.038
      Urban		  4.2	  2.6	0.007	0.002
Region					
      Western	18.7	23.6	0.047	0.016
      Central	29.5	24.2	0.066	0.021





	Analysis of the poverty profile shows that, apart from the region in which a person lives, there are several other variables that are closely correlated with poverty. One of them is physical infrastructure – greater proximity to roads is associated with lower incidence of poverty. Educational level of the household head is also an important factor – lack of education is more pervasive among the poor, and the education difference between the poor and the non-poor is especially sharp in urban areas. A couple of demographic characteristics of the households are also relevant. First, households with a higher dependency ratio tend to be poorer. Second, gender of the household head has an effect, although not a very pronounced one. Female-headed households have been found to have a slightly higher level of poverty than the male-headed ones.
	Not just poverty, inequality is also surprisingly high in Bhutan. The Gini index of expenditure distribution has been estimated to be 0.42 for the country as a whole, 0.37 in urban areas and 0.38 in rural areas in 2003 (NSB (2004b). The richest 20 per cent of the population of Bhutan enjoys nearly half (48.7 per cent) of total consumption expenditure while the poorest 20 per cent receive a share of only 6.5 per cent. These figures indicate a high degree of inequality by the standards of South Asia, especially for rural areas.​[2]​
	High levels of both poverty and inequality stem from the failure to improve the productivity of the majority of its population, in stark contrast to the achievements in social spheres. While basic needs such as health, shelter, primary education and freedom from acute hunger have been met for most people through the welfare-state policies pursued by the government, precious little has been done to enhance their income-earning capacity. Agriculture, which is the mainstay of the rural population, has received the lowest priority in terms of policies and resource allocation. The share of agriculture in total Plan outlay has come down from 15.6 per cent in The Sixth Five Year Pan (1987-92) to 10.1 per cent in the Ninth Pan (2002-07). The relative decline in public expenditure on agriculture has been brought about by privatization of many activities that used be undertaken by government corporations and the ensuing reduction of subsidies on different agricultural inputs. The evidence so far does not, however, indicate that greater play of market forces in the agricultural sector has benefited the poor people. If anything, there is some evidence to suggest that access to some of the essential support services has declined in some remote areas to the detriment of the interest of the poor. Subsistence agriculture in particular has received little support in terms of productivity-enhancing technology and inputs. On the contrary, the subsistence of many poor Bhutanese has been jeopardised by a policy of strict environmental conservation that has limited their access to forest resources and their freedom to practise shifting cultivation. 
	Whatever growth has occurred in agriculture, through crop diversification and commercialisation, has benefited mainly the large landowners, and the problem has been aggravated by high degree of inequality in the distribution of land. Although the problem of landlessness is not as acute in Bhutan as in other South Asian countries​[3]​, the distribution of land is highly skewed. Less than 10 per cent of the households owning 10 acres or more account for over 30 per cent of total agricultural land. On the other hand, nearly 14 per cent of the total agrarian households owning less than an acre account for only 1.4 per cent of the available land. The combined effect of sluggish productivity growth in subsistence agriculture, unequal distribution of land, and large landowner driven growth in commercial agriculture has manifested itself in high levels of poverty and inequality in rural areas.
	In the face of slow agricultural growth, the overall growth of the economy has been driven by hydropower and related activities in construction and power-intensive manufacturing. But the direct benefit for the poor from this growth process has been minimal, as none of these activities generates much employment. Moreover, whatever employment that has been generated by them has gone mostly to Indian workers, who have been employed in the hydropower projects and construction sites by Indian contractors entrusted with the responsibility of executing these projects. In the manufacturing activities too, Indian labourers have taken the lion’s share. Most of the industries are located near the Indian border for convenience of proximity to the Indian market, which is the main destination of their products, and daily labourers from across the border have proved to be a lot cheaper than the Bhutanese workers, whose reservation wages seem have been buoyed up by the comforts of welfare state.
	If direct benefit for the poor in terms of employment has been negligible, there is reason to suspect that any indirect benefit in terms of resource transfer has not been very significant either. In the last couple of decades, most of the incremental revenue for the government exchequer has accrued from periodic revisions in the tariff of hydropower exported to India. Taking the latest three revisions together (spanning the period from 1997 to 2005), it has been estimated that as much as 56 per cent of the additional revenue generated by higher tariffs has gone to the civil servants and elected representatives in the form of higher salary (Osmani et al. 2005, p.99). Whichever way the remainder of the additional revenue was utilized, the per capita benefit accruing to the poor population must have been a tiny proportion of the per capita benefit accruing to the governing elite. This, along with the concentration of high growth activities in capital-intensive sectors, has played a big role in sustaining a high degree of inequality.
	The preceding discussion has focussed on the magnitude of poverty and inequality at a point in time, because comparable data for other points in time are not available to permit a comparison over time. However, other indicators, such as those related to health and education, reveal considerable improvement in the standard of living. 	Both infant mortality and maternal mortality have declined significantly, leading to a spectacular increase in life expectancy from 48 years in 1984 to 66 years in 1994 (Table 9). There has also been significant improvement in educational attainment in terms of both enrolment and completion rates (Table 10).


                       Table 9: Health Status Indicators
	1984	1994	2000
Crude death rate	 13.4	  9.0	8.6
Infant mortality rate	102.8	70.7	60.5
Under-5 mortality rate	162.4	96.9	84.0
Maternal mortality rate	    7.7	 3.8	 2.6
Life expectancy	 47.5	66.1	
        Male 	 45.8	66.0	
        Female	 49.1	66.2	
			Sources: MOHE (1994, 2000), NSB (2005).


                          Table 10: School Enrolment and Completion Rates
			1990	2000
Gross Primary Enrolment Rate	55	72
Proportion of pupils starting         grade 1 who reach grade 5	73	86




	Despite rapid progress made in the past, Bhutan is still some way behind the goal of universal primary education. One of the problems surely lies in reaching educational services to a scattered population living in remote mountainous regions. However, great strides have been made in building schools in remote areas and providing free boarding facilities to students who do not have easy access to school from their homes. As a result, when the recent Living Standard Survey enquired about the reasons for children not attending school, distance of the school did not figure as a major problem. In fact, none of the urban respondents cited it as a cause and only 8 per cent of rural respondents did so. A much more important reason was economic compulsion. As much as 44 per cent of all absences were explained by either ‘cannot afford to go to the school’ or ‘the child needed to work’. It would appear that persistent poverty of the household rather than access to schooling facilities now remains the major stumbling block towards achieving the goal of universal primary education. 





Table 11: Sectoral Distribution of Employment: 1998-2004




Industry	  5.9	 4.8	 5.6	 4.0	 9.8
Services	18.1	20.3	47.9	20.5	27.0
All	100	100	100	100	100




	As in most other developing countries, open unemployment is very low in Bhutan, although it has gone up slightly from 1.4 per cent in 1998 to 2.6 per cent in 2004. 	The age distribution of the unemployed people shows open unemployment is essentially a problem of youth unemployment in Bhutan, which has more than doubled from 2.6 per cent in 1998 to 5.5 per cent in 2004. This increase has been concentrated mainly in rural areas. The combination of slow growth of agricultural production and shift towards labour-saving devices has resulted in sluggish growth in the demand for labour within agriculture. Given this scenario, the educated rural youth has tended to migrate in increasing numbers to urban areas in search of non-agricultural employment. This trend has been causing serious concern among policy-makers in Bhutan, who are struggling to provide the necessary amenities and jobs to a growing urban population.


IV. The Policy Regime





	The Government of Bhutan is keenly aware that for a small country like Bhutan, international trade is essential in order to compensate for the limited availability of domestic resources as well as to overcome the limitations of a small local market. The most important trade policy instrument employed by Bhutan is the bilateral Free Trade Agreement with India. Since India accounts for about 95 per cent of Bhutan’s export trade and over 80 per cent of its import trade, this agreement ensures that the Bhutan follows by and large an open economy policy. Bhutan also has a preferential trade agreement (PTA) with Bangladesh, which is its second largest export market. The agreement allows for various concessions on duties on a range of products under which Bangladeshi products are granted duty free access in the country while Bhutanese exports are imposed 50 per cent of the normal duty in Bangladesh. Bhutan has expressed its intention to further liberalize trade with Bangladesh through negotiations for deeper reduction in tariff and elimination of non-tariff barriers and expansion of product coverage under the existing agreement.
	Trade with countries other than India used to be controlled rigidly by a quota system until the early 1990s. Protection was not, however, the principal motive. As Bhutan is an import-dependent economy (with imports amounting to 60 or 70 per cent of GDP in recent years), there has been minimal compulsion to protect the domestic economy with import tariffs or quantitative restrictions. Due to limited domestic market, the industrial sector has been largely export oriented. The domestic agriculture sector has also not lobbied for protection, owing perhaps to a scattered population and the dominance of small subsistence farmers. Against this backdrop, the chief motivation for imposing quota restrictions came from the desire to conserve scarce hard currency rather than to protect domestic industry. These restrictions applied only to the 20-30 per cent of imports that were made in hard currency from countries other than India. The remainder i.e., the bulk of import trade, was covered under the Free Trade Agreement with India. As a result, Bhutan has long been the most open economy in South Asia, with the most liberal trade regime.
	Further liberalization took place in the early 1990s, when the country began to move away from quantitative restrictions towards imposition of taxes and tariff, as part of a broader move towards allowing market mechanism a greater role in the allocation of resources. The replacement of quotas by tariffs was also justified on the grounds that tariffs would raise additional revenue for the government, by transferring the rents that had previously accrued to importers in the form of scarcity premium.
	Beyond this conversion of quotas into tariffs, however, not much has been done by way of trade liberalization; in particular, there has been no move to reduce the tariff rates. On the contrary, the rates of sales taxes and customs duty on imported goods were actually revised upward in September 2004 by an average of 30 per cent.  The stated rationale for the revision was mainly to “conserve hard currency” by discouraging imports from third countries. Customs duty and sales tax were also increased on items like plastic to discourage its use due to environmental concerns. 
	The protective effect of customs duty, however, remains minimal for a number of reasons. First and foremost is the fact that it does not apply to trade with India, which accounts for 70-80 per cent of all imports. Secondly, even where it does apply i.e., on hard currency imports from countries other than India, there are many exemptions and leakages that dilute its effect. A much more important protective role is played by direct control on the use of convertible currency.
	As noted in section II, Bhutan has persistently run large current account deficits in its hard currency trade, which could not be offset even by the inflow of foreign grants. This suggests that Ngultrum is overvalued relative to the convertible currencies. Had there existed full current account convertibility between Ngultrum and hard currencies, this overvaluation would have been eliminated, leading to a depreciation of Ngultrum to the extent required to eliminate the current account deficit. In that case, it would not have been necessary to resort to administrative rationing of hard currency. So, the question must be asked: why isn’t convertibility allowed? The standard answer to this sort of question is that in a ‘thin’ currency market convertibility will generate excessive volatility of the exchange rate. This argument applies to Bhutan as much as in other developing countries, if not more because in Bhutan’s case the hard currency market is certainly thinner than usual.
	But there is an additional reason in the case of Bhutan which is even more compelling. Free convertibility of Ngultrum into hard currency is precluded by the policy of pegging Ngultrum to the Indian Rupee. Given the peg, Ngultrum’s exchange rates with all other currencies are determined entirely by Rupee’s rates of exchange with them. But the exchange rates that are appropriate for India are not necessarily appropriate for Bhutan. Thus, it is entirely possible for Ngultrum to be overvalued vis-à-vis hard currencies even if Rupee is not. And since the overvalued Ngultrum necessarily implies that demand for hard currencies exceeds their supply, there is no option but to resort to administrative rationing.
	The preceding analysis brings out a unique feature of Bhutan’s foreign exchange regime. In most other developing countries, administrative rationing of foreign exchange is resorted to for a variety of reasons (including an implicit belief that government can allocate scarce foreign exchange more wisely than the market), and overvaluation of the currency is a consequence of such rationing. In Bhutan, however, the direction of causality is reversed. Here overvaluation exists because of the policy of maintaining peg with the Indian Rupee, and administrative rationing is a consequence of this overvaluation.
	This raises an important issue about exchange rate policy in Bhutan. Any inefficiency caused by the overvaluation of Ngultrum vis-à-vis hard currencies, and by the administrative rationing that goes with it, is a price Bhutan has to pay if it continues to maintain a fixed peg with Rupee. It is widely acknowledged that the peg with Rupee confers many benefits to Bhutan in respect of trade with India. It is equally clear, however, that the same policy also causes inefficiency in respect of trade with the rest of the world. In particular, by causing overvaluation of Ngultrum vis-à-vis hard currencies, it inhibits the growth of hard currency exports. It is not being suggested that overvaluation is the only or even the most important reason for Bhutan’s inability to earn more hard currency; only that it also contributes to the problem.
	An important policy instrument in the context of hard currency earnings is the foreign direct investment (FDI) policy. In December 2002, the government approved the Foreign Direct Investment Policy with a view to fostering private sector development, generate employment, enable transfer of capital, technology and skills, and enhance convertible currency earnings. In the case of Bhutan, FDI is understood as investments made in convertible currency only (i.e., non-rupee investments). The foreign investor can hold up to 70 per cent of the equity. Previously, only limited foreign investment was allowed into the banking, tourism and industrial sector on a “case by case basis.” Under the new policy a wide range of manufacturing industries were opened up for foreign investment (with a minimum investment of US$ 1 million), as were services such as hotels, transport services, roads and bridges, education, business infrastructure, information technology, financial services and housing (with a minimum investment of US$ 0.5 million).
 
	Many observers feel that despite these new initiatives, the FDI policy is still unduly conservative, reflecting the cautious approach of the government aimed at ensuring that local entrepreneurs are not disadvantaged. Considering the small Bhutanese market and few comparative advantages that Bhutan offers it is unlikely that foreign investors will rush into Bhutan except in few specific sectors such as tourism and power intensive industries. Not a single foreign investor has come into Bhutan since the adoption of the FDI policy in 2002.
	Although FDI could potentially be important for export-oriented industries, the structural and locational constraints place severe limitations on its success. While access to the vast Indian market, via Bhutan, would have been an attraction even a few years ago, the economic liberalization process in India makes such a move less attractive to foreign investors today. Given the geographic realities, India will remain the most important market for Bhutanese products; therefore, the non-convertibility of the Indian Rupee on the capital account will constrain potential foreign investors from investing in Bhutan.


Monetary and financial policy

	The monetary policy framework of Bhutan can be characterized as something close to a currency board system. The domestic currency Ngultrum is pegged to Indian rupee with a one-to-one exchange rate, guaranteed by at least 100 per cent reserve backing of all the Ngultrum issued. The existence of the peg has given rise to a monetary policy by default, whose rationale is to maintain price stability through exchange rate targeting. However, unlike other countries that deliberately adopt exchange rate targeting in order to confer credibility to their anti-inflation policy, Bhutan does not have a tradition of high inflation that needed to be countered by such a device. Therefore, the initial logic of a guaranteed peg with the Indian rupee was not based on the monetary consideration of price stability. It was based on the commercial consideration of facilitating trade with India. But given the existence of the peg, and the government’s desire to maintain it on trade grounds, monetary authorities have no option but to support it. That is why exchange rate targeting as practised in Bhutan is best described as monetary policy by default. 
	As a consequence of this policy, Bhutan has entered into a de facto monetary (currency) union with India, with the inflation and interest rates of the two countries staying close together. Of course, since India happens to be by far the larger partner of this de facto union, it is the inflation and interest rate of Bhutan that track those of India rather than the other way round. 
	Until 1997, the interest rates were administered by the RMA, providing little flexibility to the financial institutions to set their own deposit and lending rates on the basis of their cost of funds, risk of default, operating expenses, and yield on assets. In order to create an environment more conducive to the growth of the financial system, the RMA partially liberalized the interest rates in October, 1997, allowing each institution to determine the rates on the basis of the prevailing market conditions. This was only a partial liberalization because the spread between lending and deposit rates continued to be determined by the RMA. However, in April 1999, to encourage competition among the financial institutions, the RMA abolished the system of spreads, liberalizing the interest rates fully on both loans and advances.
	Yet another dimension of financial liberalization relates to exchange control. Administrative control over foreign exchange transactions used to be pervasive in Bhutan and to some extent it still is. But in line with the government’s programme of liberalizing trade and industrial policies, the RMA Board approved the new Foreign Exchange Regulations 1997, removing a number of restrictions on foreign exchange transactions. The aim is to move eventually towards current account convertibility.
	After the regime of administered interest rates gave way to that of market-determined rates in 1997, there was no immediate movement in interest rates. It took a while for the market to respond to the changed environment. The first initiative came in 2000, when the Bank of Bhutan decided to lower its interest rates on selected loan schemes. Since then, a wider effect of interest rate liberalization can be observed (Table 12). The downward movement is most clearly visible in the case of deposit rates, and less so in the case of lending rates. As a result of these disparate movements between deposit and lending rates, the average interest spread, which was already high at 5.4 per cent in 2000, climbed even higher to 7.5 per cent.




                       Table 12: Trends in Interest Rates
















	What has, therefore, happened is that the financial institutions have taken advantage of liberalization to keep the interest they have to pay to depositors unchanged in real terms by lowering the nominal rates in line with declining inflation, but have raised the real interest rate they charge the borrowers by reducing the nominal rate far less than what was warranted by the fall in inflation. The interest rate spread, or the margin of intermediation, has in consequence increased in both nominal and real terms. There is, however, nothing in the real economy to suggest that the cost of financial intermediation has increased in Bhutan in the last five years to justify a rising spread. Given the shallowness of the financial market in Bhutan, the spread is understandably high, but the issue here is not why the spread is high but why it has got higher. For that, there is no apparent justification from the cost side. 
	The only inference one can draw is that given the non-competitive nature of the financial market in Bhutan, the financial institutions have exercised their market power to raise the profit margin to the maximum level the market would bear. The market was non-competitive before, as it now, and it is not being suggested that the market has become less competitive than before. What has rather happened is that with the onset of liberalization the non-competitive lenders have for the first time been able to exercise their market power, which they always had but found it artificially suppressed before by the regime of administered interest rates. In other words, while previously their market power was potential rather than actual, liberalization has enabled them to transform that potential into actual market power.
	The non-competitive nature of the financial sector stems fundamentally from the tension between the scale economies of financial intermediation and the exceedingly small size of the market in Bhutan. As the fixed costs are too high relative to the size of the market, the financial sector operates virtually in a situation of natural monopoly, or rather duopoly in the case of Bhutan. In principle, even a duopolistic market can be fiercely competitive. However, given the long tradition and vastly larger size of one of the two commercial banks (Bank of Bhutan) relative to the other ((Bhutan National Bank), the market structure that has emerged is more of the leader-follower type. The Bank of Bhutan sets the trend and the Bhutan National Bank (as well as two non-bank financial institutions) follows suit. That’s what makes the market non-competitive. The leader-follower behaviour enables both banks to enjoy the rent associated with natural monopoly instead of competing it away. The consequence, as we have seen, is the enlargement of the profit margin in the wake of financial liberalization.
	Domestic credit expanded rapidly in the wake of financial liberalisation. Total credit took a sharp upward turn in 1997, exactly the year in which financial liberalization was initiated (Table 13). Moreover, this upward turn can be attributed almost entirely to a correspondingly sharp upward turn in private sector credit. At first sight, the timing of this acceleration suggests that the financial liberalization that was initiated in 1997 might have spurred the expansion of credit. But this impression is misleading. As noted above, liberalization did not lead to any substantial decline in nominal lending rates; in fact the lending rates have actually increased in real terms. If the private sector borrowed more despite higher real interest rates, the primary reason must lie in some extraneous factors.​[5]​ These factors include mainly the construction boom stemming from the ancillary activities associated with the Tala hydropower project and a housing boom fuelled partly by rising urban affluence and partly by rapid rural-to-urban migration, especially into the capital city Thimphu.​[6]​





                       Table 13: Expansion of Domestic Credit: 1992-2004















Source: Royal Monetary Authority, Annual Report, various years.






           Table 14: Allocation of Advances by Economic Sectors
















	Another major concern is the share of agriculture. Even before liberalization, agriculture had a very low share of loans from the formal sector – just over 4 per cent. After liberalization, this small share has got even smaller, dipping below 4 per cent. In view of the low level of monetization of the agrarian economy, one would of course expect the share of loans going to agriculture to be lower than its share of GDP. But the fact that the share is exceedingly small and getting even smaller indicates continued failure on the part of the Bhutanese institutions and policies to modernise agriculture.




IV.2 The GNH Strategy of Development

	For the past two and a half decades, the development strategy of Bhutan has been underpinned by an overarching philosophy of human well-being. The present King of Bhutan enunciated this philosophy under the rubric of the Gross National Happiness (GNH) approach to development. By deliberately juxtaposing itself against the traditional pre-occupation with the Gross National Product (GNP), this philosophy explicitly rejects the purely materialistic approach to development and calls for a holistic approach to development embracing material, environmental, cultural and spiritual goals.
	For operational purposes, the GNH approach has been defined in terms of four pillars viz. (1) equitable development, ensuring equity between individuals as well as regions, (2) environmental sustainability, (3) cultural and spiritual upliftment, and (4) good governance. Although there exists some uncertainty as well as ambiguity as to how exactly to translate these principles into actual policy-making, the government of Bhutan continues to make conscious attempts to ensure that its development strategy conforms to these principles as closely as possible.​[8]​
	In support of the first pillar, namely equitable development, Bhutan has consistently emphasized the need for sustainable and geographically balanced development so to ensure equitable improvement in the well-being of all Bhutanese people. The regional dimension of development thus assumes special importance in the development strategy of Bhutan. This goal is especially relevant in Bhutan because of its demographic and geographic characteristics. A small population is scattered over a relatively large area, giving rise to low-density settlements in far-flung areas separated by rugged mountains and poorly connected with each other by roads or other means. In such a condition, the benefits of growth will not automatically percolate to all parts of the country unless special measures are taken to make sure that they do.
	The Royal Government of Bhutan has tried to implement the strategy of regionally balanced human development through various policy instruments, including political and fiscal decentralization, widespread network of primary health care, aiming for universal access to primary education, and creating a well spread out network of physical infrastructure. As a result of the concerted effort to take health facilities to the door step of rural people, as much as 90 per cent of the country has by now come to have access to these facilities. Health care is delivered through an integrated system with national, regional and district hospitals serving as referral centres, followed by the Basic Health Units (BHU) at the community level. The Units serve remote areas staffed by well-trained paramedics who are equipped to treat minor ailments and advise on preventive measures against communicable diseases. 
	In the field of education, the government not only provides free education at all levels (including higher studies abroad), but also operates a system of free boarding and lodging for needy students. Many schools provide boarding facilities for students living in areas far from the nearest school. Children from communities that do not have own schools enroll in the distant schools either as day scholar or as a boarder. This has been made possible largely through the provision of meals by the World Food Programme (WFP). At higher levels of education, a deliberate decision was made to locate the only college of the country in the eastern region, which has traditionally been the most disadvantaged part of the country for both geographical and historical reasons. The nascent University system is also designed to consist of a network of institutions of specialised education spread out in different parts of the country instead of being located in a single campus.
	Apart from providing access to health care and education as widely as possible, the government of Bhutan has also tried to meet the basic the needs of food and shelter for each and every citizen. Every citizen of Bhutan is entitled to a minimum amount of land for cultivation, so that he or she can grow the basic food needed for survival. Every household is also entitled to receive timber at heavily subsidized prices for the purpose of constructing a modest dwelling. The actual size of the subsidy is difficult to estimate, but a recent study shows that the subsidy provided during the Seventh Five Year Plan period (1992-1997) represented about 2.2 per cent of the average current expenditure during plan period.    If the commercial value of the timber were taken into account, the revenue forgone would amount to about 40 per cent of the average annual revenue for the plan period (Osmani et al. 2005).
	In keeping with its focus on balanced regional development, based on people’s participation in decision-making processes, the Royal Government of Bhutan has systematically pursued the policy of administrative and fiscal decentralization. This strategy was meant to promote simultaneously two pillars of the GNH approach – viz. equitable development and good governance. The attempt to introduce administrative decentralization dates back to 1981 when the Royal Government of Bhutan established Dzongkhag Yargay Tshogchung (DYTs) or District Development Committees giving Dzongkhag (district) administrations the responsibility of preparing and implementing their own development plans in consultation with the DYTs. In 1991, this process was extended further down to the level of gewog (block, the lowest level administrative unit), by creating Gewog Yargay Tshogchungs (GYTs).
	Cementing this process, the government has recently introduced laws that require gups, the chiefs of gewogs, to be elected on the basis of adult franchise. The chathrims (laws) of 2002 formally devolved the authorities – regulatory, administrative and financial – to the local bodies. Accordingly, the gups are equipped with the responsibilities and authorities to assess local needs, determine priorities, decide upon programmes and monitor progress. They are also responsible for collecting taxes, mobilizing resources for community services, settling local disputes, maintaining water supplies, and supervising social services.
	The system of administrative and fiscal decentralisation allows each dzongkhag and gewog to draw up its own local plan, depending on its own priorities and co-ordinated by popularly elected representatives. These local level plans constitute an integral part of the overall national Five Year Plans and are financed partly by locally mobilised resources, mainly in the form of labour contributions from the local population, and partly from subventions from the central government. In recent years, central subventions have amounted to nearly a quarter of the national budget.
	To what extent these and other efforts have succeeded in promoting a regionally balanced pattern of human development cannot be assessed fully because of the absence of sufficiently disaggregated data at the local level. However, some general patterns can be gauged from a countrywide rapid survey carried out by the Planning Commission in 2000 to assess regional indicators of well-being (RGOB 2000). The study, called the Poverty Assessment and Analysis Report (PAAR) covered all 22 townships and 201 gewogs. Indicators were developed for ten different aspects of wellbeing – viz. income, education, health, access to economic activities, physical facilities, environment, transport links, communication links, position of women, and non-material needs. A composite index was also constructed to rank different dzongkhags  and gewogs in terms of relative vulnerability.
	A major finding of this study is that despite serious efforts made in the past to achieve regional balance, six dzongkhags located in the eastern part of the country continue to remain relatively disadvantaged compared to the rest of the country. Judging by most of the separate indicators as well as a composite index of well-being, all six eastern districts were found to fall in the bottom half of the ranking. It should be emphasized that since these findings relate to a particular point in time (year 2000) and no comparable information is available for earlier periods, nothing can be inferred from these figures about the success or failure of the policy of balanced regional development. All that can be inferred is that considerable regional disparity persists even after four and half decades of planned development.
	One of the reasons for persistent disparity in well-being lies in the fact that parts of the country still suffer from lack of connectivity to the rest of the country, especially to the centres of administration and commerce. Thus the same report from which the preceding evidence was drawn also shows that the eastern districts are particularly disadvantaged in respect of connectivity. Nearly half of the gewogs which were not connected even by feeder roads belonged to the eastern districts. Similarly, some 40 per cent of gewogs that were more than 8 hours of walking distance away from the nearest highway belonged to these districts.
	A significant contributor to regional development is government expenditure at the regional level. A rough comparison of regional distribution of government expenditure with the distribution of households shows that broadly speaking the two distributions conform quite well each other, indicating a fair degree of regional equity in the distribution of government expenditure (Osmani et al. 2005). There are, however, some conspicuous exceptions. For example, four dzongkhags in the west-central region of the country received a far greater proportion of central government expenditures compared to the proportion of households they have. By contrast, there are certain other dzongkhags (three of them are in the east) for which central government expenditures are much lower than what would be warranted by their share of households. Interestingly, these two sets of dzongkhags stand at the opposite ends of the development spectrum – the former being the most developed and latter the least. To what extent unbalanced government expenditure contributes to this unequal status of development and to what extent unequal development itself warrants unequal government expenditure is difficult to judge without a deeper analysis. But the fact that unequal government expenditure contributes to some extent to unequal regional development cannot be denied.
	Notwithstanding the exceptions mentioned above, it must be acknowledged that government expenditure has on the whole been reasonably balanced across regions. The fact that balanced government expenditure on social services has so far enabled Bhutan to achieve a fairly balanced regional development in several social dimensions is confirmed by the Poverty Assessment and Analysis Report (PAAR). The study finds that while the ranking of dzongkhags in terms of the composite index of development is highly correlated with the index of physical infrastructure, indicating that lack of connectivity has held back overall progress in the backward districts, there is very little correlation between the overall ranking and ranking in terms of the health index. This suggests that government efforts have helped to redress to some extent the disadvantages of the backward districts at least in the sphere of social sectors. The task that remains is to ensure a more balanced access to productive activities for all people across the country so that the goal of an all-round balanced development can be achieved.
	There is, however, a possibility that it might be more difficult to achieve regional balance in the days to come. The present balance has been achieved mainly because of the welfare programmes the government has implemented in education and health sectors, which by their very nature tend to be distributed largely in proportion to the population in the regions under consideration. But as government expenditures are likely to be dominated in future by investment on physical infrastructures promoting competitive advantages of the regions, the possibility of increasing imbalance in regional development could easily arise.
	Environmental sustainability, the second pillar of the GNH approach, has also received high priority in the formulation of government policies. One manifestation of this priority is found in the decision to set up a Trust Fund for environment in order to insulate environment-promoting expenditures from unforeseen budgetary fluctuations. But the main strategy the government has followed for this purpose is to adopt deliberately cautious policies with respect to the use of forest resources and the expansion of tourism industry. The choices made by the government in these respects invariably entail trade-offs between environmental sustainability and other policy goals. Understanding these trade-offs is an essential part of both understanding and improving the policy regime in Bhutan. 
Bhutan lies in the Eastern Himalayas, which is recognized as one of the ten global “hot spots” for biodiversity. The microclimatic conditions prevalent in Bhutan allow for rich ecosystem diversity and it is home to numerous species of birds, animals and plants. Bhutan is lauded internationally for its environmental credentials, and the actions it has undertaken to earn these credentials include a constitutional mandate to keep at least 60 per cent of land under perennial forest cover. The present coverage is estimated to be about 72 per cent, and rising.
The forest cover is also a great asset for the people of Bhutan. Free access to forest products, especially for the rural people, has effectively helped to avert situations of extreme poverty, destitution and homelessness. Besides, timber and wood-based products derived from the forests are an important source of export earnings. Forests and watershed eco system are also important vital for maintaining water catchments areas to support agriculture, the main source of livelihood for the people, and the hydropower sector, which is the largest source of income revenue and growth. Maintenance of an adequate forest cover is thus seen as desirable from both as environmental and economic points of view.
However, some tensions are emerging between environmental and economic concerns. These tensions are arising in the context of both subsistence and commercial use of forest resources. In the context of subsistence use, an example of such tension arises from the setting aside of a large chunk of forest land as protected areas in the form of national parks. At present almost 28 per cent of the country is declared as protected area. Unlike other countries with wide expanse of pure wilderness, national parks in Bhutan also include areas with significant human settlement. Due to the extensive interface between agriculture and forestry in Bhutan the people have traditionally depended on the forests as a source of timber, food, fodder etc. Therefore, the declaration of these areas as national parks creates tensions between conservation and forest utilization. Such State interventions to govern access to resources are justified on the basis that increasing population pressure and growing commercialization could lead to over-exploitation of the forest resources. For the vast majority of the people dependent on subsistence agriculture and forest resources, however, biodiversity conservation is often a secondary concern compared to the compulsions of making a living. 
For example, the establishment of the Jigme Singye Wangchuck National Park (formerly the Black Mountain National Park) in 1995 was received with mixed responses from the public. Small communities called the Monpas depend on resin tapping from chirpine forests for over 25 per cent of their income. However, the Park management in 2002 banned resin tapping stating conservation reasons without compensation or alternative income opportunities. Such actions not only threaten livelihoods of the poor but may also be counterproductive from environmental point of view as well, because it is likely that the absence of ownership and user rights to these resources will reduce the incentive for local people to conserve and manage forest resources sustainably.
Similar tensions exist also in the commercial use of forest resources. The wood based industries form the single largest group of production and manufacturing industries in Bhutan comprising 46 per cent of total number of industries. The comparative advantage of these industries lies in the availability of cheap timber at prices ranging from US$ 65-102/m3 compared to international prices of US$ 126-238/m3. Despite the obvious comparative advantage, the The contribution of the forestry sector to exports is far below its potential. In recent years, wood products have contributed less than 5 per cent of total exports. The main reason for such low levels of export performance lies in strict conservation policies, as manifested in This is due to the ban on the the existing ban on the exports of logs, sawn timber and semi finished timber products. 
The only timber-related products that can be exported are finished wood products. The explicit reason given for this restrictive policy is promotion of greater value-addition by concentrating on finished products. But such a policy is not necessarily efficient. What matters for economic efficiency is that encouragement be given to products with comparative advantage; and products with higher value-added do not necessarily have comparative advantage over those with lower value-added. It is quite plausible that Bhutan has comparative advantage in the whole range of products starting from timber to finished wood-based products. In that case, the existing policy involves a loss of efficiency.
It might be argued that this loss of efficiency is a trade-off that Bhutan has deliberately accepted for the sake of environmental sustainability. But this argument does not stand scrutiny. Current assessment shows that thatBhutan’s timber resources in Bhutan lieare largely under utilized from both stock and the flow perspective. Taking first the perspective of stock, it has been officially estimated that about 34 per cent of the total forest area can be used for timber production. However, at present only 6 per cent is under management plans of the public corporation which has the monopoly right to extract timber for commercial purposes, and 9 per cent is around local settlements for supply of timber for the rural people. This leaves another 15 per cent of total forest area that is potentially suitable for timber extraction but not currently utilised. 




he AAC from the areas presently under official management plans is around 17 million cft per annum. However, the The At present AAC fromannual cut is only is set at about 8-9 million cubic feet (cft) per annum. Thus the isannual cut is only 50 per cent of the AAC, which indicates a vast potential to increase the amount of timber extraction in a sustainable manner and without violating the constitutional mandate of keeping at least 60 per cent of the land under forest cover.​[9]​  This assessment indicates that Bhutan may be pursuing an excessively restrictive policy with respect to the use of forest resources.
A somewhat similar argument may be made with respect to Bhutan’s policy towards tourism. While the country’s location, terrain and relative isolation have posed significant barriers to economic or industrial diversification, these very conditions also provide a strong comparative advantage for Bhutan as a special tourist destination for nature and cultural tours. However, the government of Bhutan has followed a deliberately restrictive policy of discouraging an influx of ‘low value’ tourists (such as backpackers) for fear that they might compromise the relatively pristine nature of Bhutan’s environment as well as culture. As a result, a “high value, low volume” policy has been in place since the inception of tourism in the early 1970s. Under this policy tourists must visit Bhutan in organized groups through a travel agent who offers an integrated package that includes food, lodge, transport and guide services. The minimum tariff has been fixed by the government at US$ 200 and US$ 165 per person per day for the peak season and lean season respectively, from which the government deducts US$ 65 and US$ 55 as tourism royalty. Such a cautious policy has successfully ensured that the local culture and the environment are not overwhelmed by mass tourism. 
This has, however, come at the expense of foregone economic gains. Tourism receipts amounted to only about 2 per cent of GDP in 2000. In the wake of the subsequent global slump in tourism, the contribution has come down to just over 1 per cent. Even in this restrictive form, however, tourism plays an important role in Bhutan’s economic development. It has significant potential for backward linkages in the domestic economy and for employment generation for the rising numbers of educated youth. But most importantly, it has been the largest commercial source of convertible currency earnings for Bhutan. Around 2000, the amount of convertible currencies earned through tourism was almost double the amount earned through merchandise exports (to countries other than India). Even with the subsequent decline, tourism still remains the largest earner of convertible currency.





	The long term development prospects of Bhutan are constrained by two objective conditions that limit the options open to the policymakers. These constraints arise from some special features of the demography and geography of Bhutan.
	The demographic constraint emerges from the small size of its population. With a population of just over half a million, Bhutan is one of the smallest economies in the world. While most other countries of South Asia suffer from an excess of population relative to resources, Bhutan faces the opposite problem of having too few people. There are two economic implications of small population that are relevant in this context. 
	First, a small population means a small domestic market for producers of goods and services. A small market limits the scope for specialisation and makes it hard to reap the benefits of economies of scale, without which sustained productivity growth cannot be achieved. Second, small population also means a small labour force. There are worrying signs that scarcity of labour is already beginning to limit the scope of production in different sectors of the Bhutanese economy, especially in agriculture. In other sectors such as hydropower, construction and to a limited extent manufacturing the problem of labour shortage has been circumvented by the use of cheap Indian labour. But there are political and cultural limits on how far an economy can be propped up by foreign labour. There are indications that Bhutan is not too far off those limits. It is, therefore, quite likely that at least in quantitative terms shortage of labour will remain a persistent feature of the Bhutanese economy. One implication of this constraint is that instead of adopting a labour-intensive strategy of development that suits most other countries of South Asia, Bhutan must pursue an approach that is intensive in the use of skill and technology.
	The geographical constraint also has two dimensions – one internal and one external. The internal constraint arises from the fact that the few people that Bhutan has are scattered over a large mountainous terrain. The result is low density of population combined with lack of accessibility. This is a pernicious combination because it implies firstly that transportation adds enormously to the cost of production, secondly that provision of any kind of services to the people become hugely expensive, and thirdly that setting up any local-level enterprise becomes uneconomic as it becomes difficult to reach a reasonable scale of production. The external constraint emerges from the fact that Bhutan is a landlocked country, surrounded by two giant neighbours, India and China. Friendly relations with India has enabled Bhutan to circumvent the problem to some extent by using India both as a market and a source of technology, capital as well as various types of consumer and intermediate goods. However, reaching out to the wider world remains a major problem. Moreover, political realities inhibit the prospect of taking advantage of China’s presence as a big and resourceful neighbour in the same way that India’s presence has been.
	In view of these constraints, the long-term development prospects of Bhutan must rest on the adoption of a distinctive strategy with the following characteristics: an outward-oriented economy that relies on exporting low-volume high-value goods and services based on skilled manpower and modern technology, in return for imports of most consumer goods, except for some basic foodstuff. Such a strategy would also be consistent with the GNH approach to which Bhutan is wedded, as it would minimise the country’s dependence on the use of natural resources, which has potentially adverse implications for environment and culture.
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^1	 Notes  The first comprehensive population census of Bhutan was carried out only as recently as May 2005. According to the preliminary results unofficially available, the population of Bhutan would be somewhere around 650 million.
^2	  By way of comparison, the Gini index based on consumption expenditure in Bangladesh was only 0.30 in rural areas in 2000, while in rhe urban areas the index was similar to that in Bhutan.
^3	  Survey estimates show that only 2.6 per cent of households are landless in Bhutan.
^4	  In addition, the Bhutan Living Standard Survey of 2003 also contains data on employment, but the sample size is much smaller and not directly comparable with the Labour Force Surveys. 
^5	  This is also evident from the fact that private sector credit had already increased sharply during the period 1996-2000 when lending rates had remained static in nominal terms despite liberalisation. 
^6	  Expansion of credit for the housing sector may have been helped by the fact that the lending rate for this sector was lowered more substantially than for any other sector. To that extent, interest rate liberalisation did have a role to play in the expansion of credit, but the quantitative significance of this role relative to that migration cannot be judged in the absence of a more detailed study.
^7	  Year 2000 has been taken as the cut-off line between the two periods, because although the process of liberalization started in 1997 the full effect began to be felt only after 2000 with the removal of administered spread in 1999 and the first initiative taken by the banks to alter the interest rates in 2000.
^8	  For an attempt to operationalise the concept of GNH in terms of practical policy-making, see, among others, (RGOB, 1999).
^9	  Note that the concept of annual allowable cut (AAC) is not directly related to the constitutional mandate of keeping at least 60 per cent of land under forest cover. However, since extraction of timber up to the limit of AAC would by definition sustain the present forest cover, and since the present cover is higher than the minimum cover mandated by the constitution, it follows that raising the flow of extraction up to the AAC level would not violate the constitutional mandate.
